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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
_MICHAEL MUKASKEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT S. AARON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11088 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE1\1ENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for personal 
injuries arising out of an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Seventh Judicial District Court, at a Pretrial 
hearing, granted a summary judgment of No Cause of 
Action in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the entry of the sum-
mary judgment and seeks a decision remanding the 
case for trial by jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Amended Complaint alleges that on the 3rd 
day of August, 1963, plaintiff was riding as a passenger 
in a 1963 Chevrolet automobile being driven by the 
defendant. That near the City of Huntington, Emery 
County, State of Utah, defendant so negligently ancVor 
willfully misconducted himself in the operation of said 
automobile as to cause an accident which resulted iii 
plaintiff suffering severe personal injuries. 
Defendant answered the Amended Complaint and 
admitted plaintiff was a passenger in the automobile, 
but denied defendant was negligent or guilty of willful 
misconduct. As an affirmative defense, defendant 
alleged he was driving the automobile as the agent 
or under the control of plaintiff and therefore, his neg-
ligence, any, was imputed to plaintiff. 
In reply to the defense of imputed negligence, 
plaintiff claimed the parties were engaged in a joint 
enterprise and therefore, the negligence of the def end· 
ant driver would not be imputed to plaintiff. 
Defendant filed :Motions for Summary Judgment 1 
In support of these motions, defendant had publisheJ 
and introduced into evidence the depositions of th1 
2 
parties. In these depositions, the parties testified to 
their legal relationship and the facts surrounding the 
accident. 
Plaintiff testified he and the defendant were school 
friends and residents of the New York City area; that 
during the summer of 1963 they decided to travel to-
gether to the western part of the United States, and, 
particularly to Utah and Colorado area to look for 
employment on oil rigs. They secured transportation 
for tlteir trip by answering an ad in the New York 
Times which offered rides to Denver and California 
on a share expense basis. After arriving in Colorado, 
they lived and worked in several towns, including Craig, 
Colorado, and on August 2, 1963, returned to the City 
of Denver. Up to this point they shared equally all 
of their expenses for lodging, food and transportation. 
lVhile in Denver, they decided to continue their 
trip west and travel to the State of California. An 
additional reason for selecting this state was to enable 
defendant to visit his brother. To obtain transportation 
for this journey, the parties answered a newspaper 
ad of the Atlantic Pacific Driveaways Company which 
furnished to qualified applicants an automobile to be 
driven to California. 
In order to qualify for this automobile, it was 
necPssary to post a $25.00 deposit and execute a writ-
ten eontract with the company. Due to the financial 
l'ondition of defendant, plaintiff consented to make the 
deposit and sign the contract. It was agreed, however, 
3 
that defendant had equal right to drive the automobile. 
It was also agreed that defendant would repay one 
half the deposit, or $12.50 and pay one half of all of 
the operating expenses. 
The contract was general in nature and by its terms 
transferred possession of the automobile to plaintiff. 
(Ptf. Dep. pgs. 8-20}. 
The defendant, by his deposition, verified all of , 
the facts testified to by the plaintiff. (Dft. Dep. pgs. 
5-12}. 
After completing these arrangements with the 
company they received a 1963 Chevrolet automobile 
and started their trip to California. 
In describing the accident, the parties testified that 
after leaving Denver they alternated driving and slept 
in the automobile that evening. The following day, 
defendant started driving and immediately prior to the 
accident was traveling at a speed of approximate]\' 
50 miles per hour. Defendant testified that he suddenly 
approached a curve and because of his speed was unable 
to negotiate the same and the automobile left the high-
way and overturned. Plaintiff testified that just prior 
to the accident he had been sleeping and awakened 
just as the automobile entered the curve. Plaintiff ad-
mitted that prior to this point in the journey defendant 
had evidenced reasonable care in the manner in which 
he drove the automobile. (Dft. Dep. pgs. 16-19). 
Defendant contended the testimony from these 
depositions established, as a matter of law, there was 
4 
no issue of fact regarding the claim of either joint enter-
prise or willful misconduct. On two separate occasions, 
Judge Keller and Judge Ruggeri denied Motions for 
summary judgment. At the conclusion of the pretrial 
conference, however, defendant, over the objection of 
plaintiff, again moved for a dismissal. This time, Judge 
Ruggeri granted the .Motion. In rendering this decision, 
the court stated as follows: 
" * * * The Court feels that, the Court was 
about - - - let me say, to grant the Motion at 
the time the matter was overruled, and felt that 
there might be some question of fact as argued 
by counsel for the plaintiff in his memorandum, 
that there might be some question of fact. The 
Court is of the opinion that there is no question 
of fact; * * * and it is ordered that Summary 
Judgment be had * * * in favor of defendant 
and against plaintiff." 
It is the entry of this judgment which is the subject 
of this appeal. 
POINT I 
TO JUSTIFY SU~1MARY JUDGMENT, 
I • THERE MUST BE NO GENUINE ISSUE OF 
FACT PRESENTED. 
As previously stated, the pretrial judge, in granting 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ruled 
1 there was no genuine issue of fact concerning either 
tl1e legal relationship between the plaintiff and defend-
ant or whether defendant was guilty of willful mis-
5 
conduct in the manner in which he drove the auto. 
mobile. If an issue of fact existed with respect to these 
matters, then the trial court committed error. See 
Young vs. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P. 2d 862· . 
I 
Morris vs. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P. 2d 
298. 
In Abdulkabir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339, this court stated: 
"We are in accord with the idea that the right 
of trial by jury should be scrupulously safe· 
guarded. This, of course, does not go as far as to 
require the submission to a jury of issues of fact 
merely because they are disputed. If they would 
not establish a basis upon which plaintiff could 
recover, no matter how they were resolved, it 
would be useless to consume time, effort and 
expense in trying them, the saving of which is 
the very purpose of summary judgment proce-
dure. The pertinent inquiry is whether under 
any view of the facts the plaintiff could recover. 
It is acknowledged that in the face of a motion 
for dismissal on summary judgment, the plain-
tiff is entitled to have the trial court, and this 
court on review, consider all of the evidence 
which plaintiff is able to present, and every in-
ference and intendment fairly arising therefrom : 
in the light most favorable to him." 
With this controlling rule in mind, plaintiff will 
now move on to a consideration of whether the plead-
ings and depositions and statements made at the pre· 1 
trial conference present a genuine issue of fact that 
should have been presented to a jury. 
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POINT II 
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED 
ERROR IN RULING THE PARTIES WERE 
NOT ENGAGED IN A JOINT ENTERPRISE. 
It is a well accepted principle of law that the legal 
relationship of a joint enterprise or joint venture may 
exist between a driver of an automobile and a passenger 
riding with him. It is also well accepted that in this 
relationship the negligence of the driver is not imputed 
to the passenger so as to preclude recovery in an action 
between the two members of the joint enterprise. This 
legal proposition is set forth by the following authori-
ties: 
In 8 Am. Jur., 2d, Automobiles, Sec. 681, P. 233, 
is stated: 
"The negligence of one member of a joint 
enterprise driving a motor vehicle may not be 
imputed to another member of the joint enter-
prise riding with him, for the purpose of pre-
cluding liability of the former to the latter for 
personal injuries resulting from the negligent 
operation of the vehicle. In other words, where 
one joint adventurer is guilty of a tortious act 
in the operation of a motor vehicle to the damage 
of an associate in the joint venture, he must re-
spond in damages." 
In the annotation 62 A.L.R. 440, 85 A.L.R. 630, ap-
pears the following: 
"The rule announced in the reporting case 
that the doctrine of imputed negligence is in-
7 
applicable to a member of a joint enterprise 
or common adventurer injured as a result of 
negligence of the owner or operator of an auto. 
mobile while using it within the scope of the 
enterprise while the act is between the parties to 
the enterprise, has been followed or at least 
recognized in the following cases. * * *" 
It is also a well accepted principle of law that in 
cases involving joint enterprise, a determination of the 
issue is a matter which should be presented to a jury. 
See Robinson Transportation Co., et aL, v. Hawkeye-
Security Insurance Company, 385 P. 2d 203, wherein 
the Wyo ming Court, in ref erring to another case, 
stated: 
"Where the existence of the relationship is ' 
in issue, the question is pre-eminently one for 
the finder of fact." 
In Howard v. Alta Chevrolet Company, et al., 
243 P. 2d 804, the California Court stated as follows: 
"The law is well settled that in order to come ~ 
within the joint enterprise rule, a passenger in 
an automobile must either exercise control or 
have the right to exercise control over its opera-
tion. * * * Whether or not such a right of control 
exists depends upon the circumstances in each 
particular case, and usually depends up?n ser-
eral questions of fact which are for the Jury to 
determine in light of the applicable prineiples 
of law." 
See Re-Statement of Law, Torts 2d, Section .t.91 
( c) wherein it is stated: 
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"The elements which are essential to a joint 
enterprise are commonly stated to be four: (I) 
an agreement, express or implied, among the 
members of the group; (2) a common purpose 
to be carried out by the group; ( 3) a community 
of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among 
the members; and ( 4) an equal right to a voice 
in the direction of the enterprise, which gives 
an equal right of control. Whether these ele-
ments exist is frequently a question for the jury, 
under proper direction from the court." 
This court, in a number of decisions, has set forth 
the requirements necessary to establish this legal rela-
tionship of joint enterprise in automobile cases. 
In the early case of Derrick v. Salt Lake Railway 
Cumpa11,1;, 50 Utah 573, 168 P. 335, plaintiff was a 
passenger in a car being driven by the owner. Both 
parties were salesmen and were traveling to Northern 
Ctah and Idaho when they collided with defendant's 
train at a crossing. The evidence revealed the parties 
had planned the trip together and plaintiff was to pay 
~ ~ his proportionate share of the expenses. Based on this 
l-
Jl 
h 
to 
ll 
testimony, defendant requested the court to instruct 
the jury on the theory of joint enterprise and imputed 
negligence. The trial court refused. In reversing this 
ruling, this court stated as follows: 
"The undisputed evidence shows that the auto-
mobile trip was a joint affair in which :Merritt 
and plaintiff were mutually and equally inter-
ested, and in which their rights to direct and 
govern the conduct of each other in relation 
thereto were coextensive. Each had a voice and 
9 
the right to be heard in regard to the details of , 
the tri,p. Merritt testified that 'the arrangements 
were equal; that is ,they were mutual among 
us all.' He further testified: '\Vhen we started 
we had agreed to take lots of time and not drive 
fast. We discussed this on the way out,' and 
that 'it was clearly understood' that each would 
pay his share of the expenses of the trip. Plain-
tiff testified that costs of the trip included gaso-
line, oil, tires, 'wear and tear on the car, and 
other expenses connected with the trip.' 
The contractual relations of plaintiff and his 
traveling companions were substantially the 
same as they would have been if they had jointly 
hired an automobile with which to make the trip, 
with the understanding that they woud jointly 
pay the expenses and mutually and concurrently 
direct the journey and the details thereof. The 
trip was therefore a joint enterprise in which 
these parties had a community of interest and 
in which they all equally had a voice and a right 
to be heard respecting the details of the journey. 
Under these circumstances the negligence of 
Merritt in the management of the automobile 
at the time of the collision was imputed to plain-
tiff. * * * 
Under the law applicable to the admitted facts 
defendant would have been entitled to have the 
jury instructed, if it had so requested, that if 
they should find that Merritt was negligent, such 
negligence, as a matter of law, would be imputed 
to plaintiff." 
This rule was followed in Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah , 
179, 117 P. 2d 224, and Hill v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2rl 
164, 417 P.2d 664. 
10 
In Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1045, 
.Justice \ V olf e discussed the theory of joint enterprise 
as follows: 
"In several of the cases there were slight cir-
cumstances beyond the mere owner's presence; in 
others there are loose statements of there being 
a 'joint enterprise' or 'common purpose,' when 
the common purpose was only a destination or 
a pleasure ride such as any guest might par-
ticipate in. Certainly where a driver invites 
several to go to a dance or agrees to carry them 
because he is going there himself, there is in a 
sense a common purpose; but no sound decision 
ever imputed the driver's negligence to the guests 
just because they were all pleasure riding and 
meant to enjoy themselves together or sepa-
rately at the journey's end. Such a joint venture 
or common enterprise as makes occupants of 
a car mutual agents and principlals in the opera-
tion of the car is one in which the business they 
are on or which they intend to do on the outcome 
of the journey involves such a community of 
interest and obligations as will make the trip 
itself an integral part of such venture, and 
therefore each throughout the trip is the agent 
of the other, not only for the purpose to be 
accomplished by the journey, but in the journey 
itself. The purpose for which they are being 
transported and the thing which they intend to 
do must involve such a community of interest 
as to make each the agent of the other in the 
actual accomplishment of that final purpose, 
so that there is derived from the mutual agency 
in the control and operation of the car on the 
journey which is an inseparable incident from 
the purpose on which they are going, the pur-
11 
pose and the trip itself being considered as one 1 
whole transaction in which throughout there is I 
a reciprocal agency or a cross-relationship of 
agent .a1:1d principal. .The nature of the thiug 
to be JOmtly accomplished makes the trip itself ' 
a part of that purpose. * * *" 
See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Autornobiles and Highway 
Traffic, Sec. 679, page 230 and 48 A.L.R. 1055, 1061. 
In applying the foregoing principles to the case 
at bar, it is clear all of the elements listed have been 
established by the testimony of the parties. 
The parties testified as to their agreernent; their 
community of purpose; their equal right to control and 
their agreement to share equally all of the expenses 
and costs of the trip. The foregoing facts are supported 
by the record. Plaintiff is at a loss to understand what 
additional proof is necessary to establish the legal 
relationship of joint enterprise. 
Plaintiff submits this case presents a classic situ-
ation of two persons banding together to jointly accom· , 
plish a common goal. Plaintiff respectfully submits 
that for a court to conclude, as a matter of law, that 
the testimony of the parties did not at least raise an , 
issue of fact as to whether they were engaged in a joint ' 
enterprise, is to completely ignore the testimony of the 
parties and the proper inferences to be drawn there-
from. We submit this is not a case where two mutual 
friends were embarking on a trip to the corner drug , 
store for a soda or on a duck hunting trip, but this is 
a case where two people, 1.500 miles from their home. 
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1 were joined together for not only their mutual benefit, 
but because of necessity. It is our position that when 
these parties obtained the automobile and commenced 
, the trip to California, each had a vested interest in the 
automobile and the trip and each had an equal voice 
and right to be heard respecting the details of the 
journey. 
In view of the testimony contained in the depo-
sitions and considering the same in the light most favor-
' able to plaintiff, we respectfully submit a jury question 
\\'as presented regarding the legal relationship of the 
parties and the decision of the pretrial judge was error. 
POINT III 
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE 'VAS PRECLUD-
ED FRO"M CONSIDERING A MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDG~IENT. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the pretrial judge 
was precluded from entertaining the Motion for a Sum-
mary .Judgment. As the court will recall, on August 
20, 1905, Judge Keller, in denying the same motion, 
stated in a memorandum decision as follows: 
"I conclude from the allegation of the de-
fendant Aaron's answer that he and the plaintiff 
were engaged in a joint or common enterprise 
~ ' at the time of the plaintiff's alleged injuries 
* * *" 
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Plaintiff respectfully submits that in view of tht 1 
foregoing decision, the pretrial judge abused his ck · 
cretion in reconsidering the motion. 
\Ve submit that a party is entitled to rely on deci-
sions made by judges and the pretrial judge should 
have deferred a ruling on the issue of joint enterprise 
until all of the evidence had been presented to him and 
the parties had rested. The court would then have been , 
in a position to consider the merit of Judge Keller1 . 
decision. Therefore, we respectfully submit the court ' 
should reverse the decision of the pretrial judge. 
POINT IV 
THERE 'VAS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
1 
WILL:F'UL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
'Vhile plaintiff does not concede he was a passenger 
in the automobile and not abandoning the argument 
made under the other points of this brief, plaintifi 
respectfully submits there was an issue of fact regarding 
the willful misconduct of defendant. As the court will i 
recall, defendant was traveling at approximately 50 · 
miles per hour when he suddenly became aware he: 
was approaching a curve. In view of his excessi1e · 
speed, he was unable to negotiate the curve and there-. 
fore the automobile left the road, overturned and caused 
injuries to plaintiff. 
14 
It is the position of plaintiff that reasonable minds 
' could conclude that defendant, in driving at such an 
excessive rate of speed in an area of which he was 
unfamiliar constituted willful misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above set forth, and in the interest 
of justice, it is respectfully submitted that this Court 
should reverse the District Court ruling and remand 
the case for a trial by jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RA,VLINGS, 'VALLACE, ROBERTS 
& BLACK 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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